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Abstract—This paper presents the latest development in 
(Extra-high Voltage) EHV network pricing in the UK. It 
introduces the amendment made to Long-run Incremental Cost 
(LRIC) pricing and Forward Cost Pricing (FCP) as suggested to 
overcome their particular disadvantages appearing in practice. 
Particularly, this paper investigates three scaling approaches 
examined and considered by Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs) for revenue reconciliation. A small system is utilized to 
demonstrate the calculation of the three approaches and the final 
unrecovered revenue.   
 
Index Terms—Distribution network charges, Long-run 
incremental cost pricing, Forward cost pricing, Revenue 
reconciliation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N 2005, the UK’s gas and electricity markets watchdog – 
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 
commissioned  the University of Bath (UoB) to investigate the 
potential benefits of introduction new charging methodologies 
in distribution networks and their efficiency in encouraging 
economic distribution network development [1]. Since then, 
the design and research of charging models in the UK has 
undergone dramatic progress. Network pricing is utilized to 
price network customers according to their use-of-system 
(UoS) to recover the costs from Distribution Network 
Operators (DNOs), such as direct operating costs, indirect 
costs, network work rates and transmission exit charges, etc.  
Prior to 2007, all 7 DNO in the UK used the Distribution 
Reinforcement Model (DRM) to charge network users for their 
use of distribution networks, but their methodology 
implementations differed widely. The DRM was proposed by 
Electricity Council in the UK in 1982 as an approach for cost 
allocation for DNOs. Since then, DRM has been the 
foundation for distribution tariff setting in England and Wales 
[2]. Ofgem has been keening to reforming the DRM model for 
one key reason is that it generates a flat charge at each voltage 
level and offers no locational incentivizes to guide distributed 
generators to locate closer to load centers apart from 
differentiating voltage levels. The other issue is with the 
divergence in the implementation of DRM pricing among the 7 
DNOs, which makes it hard for suppliers to understand and 
interpret each DNO’s implementation [3].  
Two economic charging methodologies emerged as the 
preferred candidates by the industry for the development of 
common distribution charging methodologies – Long-run 
Incremental Cost (LRIC) Pricing and Forward Cost Pricing 
(FCP). The LRIC model was originally proposed by UoB in 
conjunction with Ofgem and Western Power Distribution 
(WPD)[4]. The FCP model was initially developed by Scottish 
and Southern (SSE), Central Networks (CN), and Scottish 
Power (SP) for pricing users [5, 6]. They are considered by the 
industry as well as Ofgem as the best available approaches to 
achieve the high level charging principles, cost-reflectivity, 
simplicity, and predictability. Due to the complexity of the two 
economic charging methodologies, however, it is agreed by the 
industry that the current DRM pricing model is retained for 
HV/LV network charging, whereas the two charging models 
are only applicable for EHV networks. Ofgem allows DNOs to 
choose one from the two models to implement [3].  
Thus, from 2008 onwards, the GB distribution pricing 
reform has been running in two fronts. One is further 
development of the cost-reflective and forward looking 
distribution charging methodologies that can encourage the 
efficiency use of networks. The other is to achieve the 
commonality in network charging as far as possible across all 
7 DNOs so as to reduce the effort suppliers endure in 
developing tariffs for end consumers.  
In practice, however, many problems appeared when 
implementing the two approaches. Thus, Ofgem has allowed 
all DNOs to delay the submission of their approaches to 1 
April 2011 and implementation in 1 April 2012. This decision 
gives the DNOs more time to review the issues concerning 
their implementation, to justify their level of charges, to 
conduct further consultancy with stakeholders and to make 
customers understand their charges. At all times, the 7 DNOs 
have been trying to improve their pricing model and scaling 
for revenue reconciliation. 
 This paper seeks to report the recent progress that the 
industry has made to the two distribution pricing models 
proposed by DNOs. Particularly, it presents the scaling 
approaches examined and considered by DNOs for their 
revenue reconciliation. An intensive demonstration and 
analysis of three scale methods: traditional fixed adder, voltage 
level adder and site specific adder is conducted on a small test 
system.  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
gives a brief introduction to the LRIC and FCP models and 
compares them. In Section III, the new amendment for them is 
introduced. Section IV reports and demonstrate the three 
scaling approaches. Section V concludes this paper. 
II.  INTRODUCTION OF LRIC AND FCP 
The 7 DNOs in the UK agreed on achieving unity in 
HV/LV network charges, but they differ in which of the two 
preferred EHV charging methodologies would be better in 
meeting the high level charging objectives. Rather than going 
to competition commission and risking of delaying the 
distribution pricing project, Ofgem allowed the GB DNOs to 
choose one of the two preferred charging methodologies. The 
industry is therefore working on the two common EHV 
charging methodologies and aiming to achieve commonality. 
A.  Long-run Incremental Cost Pricing 
The LRIC model works by examining the changes in 
components’ future reinforcement horizons affected by nodal 
injections and translating the changes into the variation of 
components’ present value of future reinforcement. 
Components’ investment horizons are decided by their present 
loading conditions, their spare capacity and the perceived load 
growth rate [4]. The final charge for a busbar is the summation 
of the price from all its supporting components calculated 
under a given discount rate.   
 
Reinforcement A Reinforcement B Reinforcement C
Reinforcement A Reinforcement B Reinforcement C
Time
Before injection
After injection
 
Fig.1.  The principle of long-run incremental cost pricing [7]. 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic concept behind LRIC and its 
rough implementation steps are summarized as [4] 
1) To work out components’ original reinforcement horizons 
without any injections. Components’ original loading levels 
are assessed with power flow analysis, which are then 
submitted into the formulas for determining their 
reinforcement horizons. 
2) To determine components’ new reinforcement horizons with 
injections. They are determined by examining how nodal 
injections would affect their loading levels with incremental 
flow analysis and submitting into the formulas for assessing 
horizons.   
3) To assess nodal unit price. The charge for a nodal is all the 
incremental costs incurred from its supporting components, 
which are then discounted back into as present value of future 
reinforcement. 
B.  Forward Cost Pricing 
With FCP pricing, each license distribution service area 
network is broken down into a number of ‘Network Groups’, 
such that each group is part of a distribution system that is not 
connected to adjacent Groups at the same voltage level under 
normal operating conditions [2]. By contrast, FCP model treats 
demand and generation separately to derive charges. 
FCP demand price is calculated by assessing network 
reinforcement cost to support a maximum of 15% demand 
increment for each network group over the next 10 years rather 
than assets’ lifetime [8]. The demand growth is from the 
forecast in each network group. Potential reinforcement cost is 
calculated and averaged at each voltage level within the same 
network group such that the total revenue recovered equals to 
the forecasted reinforcement cost plus a certain level of 
investment return. Fig.2 depicts its demand pricing concept.  
 
Reinforcement A Reinforcement B Reinforcement CYear 1 Year 10
Demand increments  
Fig. 2. FCP charging for demand [7]. 
 
FCP generation price consists of two parts: reinforcement 
cost and generation benefit. Reinforcement cost is evaluated 
by aggregating the cost of the total present value of the 
reinforcement project required to accommodate potential 
generators over 10 years, as depicted in Fig.3. The size of the 
test generator for each voltage level is 85th percentile of the 
existing generation size at that level [9]. Generation benefit 
comes because generators can reduce the needed 
reinforcement caused by demand increase. The benefit on a 
distribution network at each voltage level is set equal to the 
corresponding demand costs, scaled down by a factor that 
reflects the reliability of the generation technology suggested 
in Engineering Recommendation P2/6 (ER P2/6) [5]. Total 
FCP generation charge is generation cost minus generation 
benefit. 
 
Reinforcement A Reinforcement B Reinforcement CYear 1 Year 10
Test-size generator  
Fig.3. FCP charging for generation[7]. 
 
FCP charges within the network group are the same for all 
customers connected to the group [2]. 
By comparison of the two approaches, the granularity of 
the locational message[10], the strength of the message [10], 
and complexity and other features of the two approaches are 
summarized in Table I.  
It is hard to directly tell which one is better over the other, 
as they have particular advantages of advantages. Generally, 
LRIC offers the strongest locatonal signals, reflecting both the 
distance and the degree of utilization in network assets. FCP 
offers weak locational message, this is both in terms of 
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magnitude of charges and granularity of charges. In terms 
complexity, LRIC requires AC power flows and contingency 
analyses, but treat generation and demand the same. FCP 
represents the most complicated charging model, which arises 
from the different treatment between generation and demand. 
 
 
TABLE I 
THE COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF LRIC AND FCP 
 LRIC FCP 
Price 
granularity 
Node Network group 
Reinforcemen
t requirements 
Change in net present 
value of reinforcements 
due to tinny injections 
Cost of reinforcements in 
10 years period 
Demand 
growth 
Fixed at 1% or chosen 
based on load prediction 
Derived from LTDS 
Charge for 
demand 
Notional asset costs to 
accommodate the potential 
demand growth 
Investment costs in 10 
years averaged at each 
GSP group 
Charge for 
generation 
Change in net present 
value of reinforcements 
due to tinny minus 
injection 
Summation of generation 
cost and demand benefits 
Locational 
signal type 
Strong  and nodal Weak and group 
Treatment of 
network 
security 
N-1 and N-2 contingencies 
N-1 and N-2 
contingencies 
Simplicity 
AC load flow and 
contingency analysis 
AC load flow and 
contingency analysis; 
treat demand and 
generation separately 
III.  NEW PROGRESS IN LRIC AND FCP 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the two models 
some improvements have been made to the two approaches 
proposed by industry. 
A.  Improvement of Long-run Incremental Cost Pricing 
One major problem with the LRIC model is that in some 
particular cases, extremely large contingency factors of 
network components might be obtained. Once they are utilized 
to reshape components’ maximum available capacity to 
accommodate N-1 and N-2 contingencies [11, 12], their 
equivalent utilization levels would be escalated extremely 
high. In this case, even a small injection would cause great 
change in their reinforcement horizons, and consequently lead 
to high charges. The reason behind is that these components 
are lightly utilized in normal conditions, but greatly loaded 
during network contingencies. Therefore, their contingency 
factors, which are calculated with their maximum contingency 
flows with their normal case flows, become rather big. Hence, 
it is proposed that “sense-checking” needs to be done on the 
power flow derived from the application of contingency 
factors beforehand. Particularly, thresholds can be employed 
to cap network contingency factors [10]. 
Another issue with the LRIC model is that some branches 
might be over recovered. It is because that the model would 
generate extremely high charges in specific cases that 
perceived load grow rates are small branches’ utilization levels 
are high. The revenue recovered alone from the LRIC charges 
would overpass the total allowed revenue. In order to avoid 
such instances, it has been suggested that scaling factors be 
introduced for the branches with excessive recovery so that the 
recovered revenue will not overpass the annuitized costs of the 
components [10]. 
B.  Improvement of Forward Cost Pricing 
The trickiest issue with FCP is pricing for generation. In 
order to work out the results, it employs a test generator to 
examine how much investment needed to accommodate the 
development in generation. The selection of the sizes of test 
generators has a significant impact on the determination of 
network investment and consequently the final charges. As for 
FCP generation price, it is quite sensitive to the size of test 
generator and the forecasted new generation. If improperly 
handled, the derived charges would become misleading, 
unable to truly reflect the UoS by generation. Therefore, the 
industry advised that the testing of the impact of generation 
across networks needs to be increased to create a more 
rigorous and reflective generation testing regime. In addition, 
it is also suggested that “sense-checking for the test size 
generators (TSGs)” be done to avoid circumstance that over 
estimation of future generation appears. A threshold can be 
used to control the TSGs [10].  
IV.  NEW IMPROVEMENT IN SCALING 
Normally, neither incremental nor marginal charges can 
recover the revenue allowed for DNOs. Revenue reconciliation 
process, i.e., scaling is used to adjust the charges to match the 
revenue target and allocate the difference (shortfall or excess) 
among network users. The mechanisms used by DNOs are 
equally important due to the fact that in practice, a large 
proportion of their revenue may be recovered through such 
scaling mechanism and it may have a significant impact on the 
relative level of nodal tariffs.  
There are two commonly adopted revenue reconciliation 
approaches to adjust the nodal prices, namely "fixed adder" 
and "fixed multiplier" [13]. The fixed adder method 
adds/subtracts a constant amount to/from the nodal charges to 
make up for the revenue shortfall/surplus. The multiplier 
method scales the nodal charges by a constant factor 
corresponding to the ratio of the target revenue to the 
recovered revenue [14]. These two approaches are not new, 
but the fixed adder approach is favored by Ofgem since it can 
preserve the internal economic signals of charges. The recent 
progress in the improvement of scaling targets at amending 
fixed adder to incorporate more planning concerns to properly 
allocate the unrecovered revenue among customers. The 
examined and considered approaches by the DNOs are 
traditional fixed adder, voltage level adder and site specific 
adder.  
The demonstration and comparison of the three scaling 
methods is carried out on the small system given in Fig.4. Its 
all commercial and technical information is given in Table I. It 
is assumed that the total allowed revenue is £1million. The 
recovered revenue from network charge is calculated as £0.4 
million. Therefore, £0.6million needs to be recovered through 
scaling, which is split between customers according to their 
capacity. 
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Fig.4. A small illustration example 
 
TABLE I 
INFORMATION OF THE SMALL SYSTEM [10] 
Customer 
132 kV 
customer 
(D1) 
33 kV 
customer 1 
(D2) 
33 kV 
customer 2 
(D3) 
Capacity 50,000kVA 10,000kVA 40,000kVA 
Charge £2/kVA/year £10/kVA/year 
£5/kVA/year 
 
Recovery from 
charge 
£100,000 £100,000 £200,000 
Notional assets at 
132 kV 
£2 million £5 million £3 million 
Notional assets at 33 
kV 
Not used £7 million £3 million 
 
A.  Traditional Fixed adder  
As explained previously, this method generates a uniform 
fixed adder in £/kVA/yr for scaling in a DNO’s territory. It 
does not use assets but works on an aggregated network use, 
calculated based on the percentage of agreed import capacity. 
For this simple example, a fixed adder of £6kVA/yr is 
derived, which comes from by dividing the total unrecovered 
revenue of £0.6 million with the total demand capacity of 
100,000kVA. By applying this fixed adder to all customers in 
the system, the following data can be obtained, summarized in 
Table II. 
 
Table II 
REVENUE RECOVERED THROUGH TRADITIONAL FIXED ADDER 
Customer 
132 kV 
customer (D1) 
33 kV customer 
1 (D2) 
33 kV customer 
2 (D3) 
Capacity 50,000kVA 10,000kVA 40,000kVA 
Recovery from 
charge 
£100,000 £100,000 £200,000 
Scaling £300,000 £600,000 £240,000 
Total recovery £400,000 £160,000 £440,000 
B.  Voltage Level Adder 
This scaling approach also does not use network assets, but 
instead, it use a measure of network utilized at each voltage 
level by customers to work out the specific adders at each 
level.  
TABLE III 
REVENUE RECOVERED THROUGH VOLTAGE LEVEL ADDER 
Customer 
132 kV customer 
(D1) 
33 kV customer 
1 (D2) 
33 kV customer 2 
(D3) 
Capacity 50,000kVA 10,000kVA 40,000kVA 
Recovery 
from charge 
£100,000 £100,000 £200,000 
Scaling £150,000 £90,000 £360,000 
Total 
recovery 
£250,000 £190,000 £560,000 
This example has two voltage levels: 132 kV and 33 kV, 
each supporting a demand of 100,000kVA and 50,000kVA 
respectively. The total notional asset cost at both 132kV level 
and 33 kV are £10million, and hence the unrecovered revenue 
should be split equally between the two voltage levels equally. 
The fixed at 132 kV level is derived by dividing of the total 
unrecovered at 132 kV level (£0.3million) with the total 
demand capacity it supports (100kVA), which gives 
£3/kVA/yr. Similarly, the fixed adder at 33 kV level is 
calculated as £6kVA/yr. The total revenue recovered from 
scaling is calculated though applying the two voltage level 
adders at each voltage level to the three customers. As noted, 
the two customers at 33 kV level use both 132 kV and 33 kV 
components, and hence they need to pay the revenue from the 
scaling at both levels. The revenue recovered from the three 
customers is given in Table III. 
C.  Site Specific Adder 
This scaling approach allocates the unrecovered revenue 
based on the level of assets used by each demand customers. 
Instead of assuming the average use of assets at each network 
level by each customer, it utilizes a “network use factor” for 
each customer to measure their use of system. The factor of 
each component for a particular customer can be obtained 
through power flow analysis.  
 
TABLE IV 
REVENUE RECOVERED THROUGH SITE SPECIFIC ADDER 
Customer 
132 kV 
customer 
(D1) 
33 kV customer 
1 (D2) 
33 kV customer 
2 (D3) 
Capacity 50,000kVA 10,000kVA 40,000kVA 
Recovery from 
charge 
£100,000 £100,000 £200,000 
Scaling £150,000 £90,000 £360,000 
Total recovery £250,000 £190,000 £560,000 
 
In this example, L1 is solely used by D1, and therefore its 
use factor is 1, giving a fixed adder of £1.2/kV/yr, which is 
calculated by allocation the unrecovered revenue allocates to 
the component, coming to £0.06 million and then dividing with 
the demand capacity of 50,000kVA.  Similarly, T1 and L2 are 
only used by D2, and T2 and L3 only support D3, which will 
eventually produce network use factors of 1 for all four 
component. The fixed adders of these components for the two 
customers can be obtained in the same way. The finally 
calculated recovered revenue is summarized in Table IV.  
If a component is utilized by more than one customer, the 
site specific adder of a component for particular customers will 
be smaller than 1, which can be computed by running power 
flow analysis to examine how the component is utilized by the 
customers. 
As can be seen from the previous three tables, the three 
scaling methods generate rather different recovery from the 
three customers. Whatever scaling approaches the DNOs 
choose, they should: 1) recover a fair allocation of allowed 
revenues from users; 2) should preserve forward-looking cost 
signals from LRIC/FCP; 3) the final charges after scaling 
should be cost-reflective and justifiable [10, 15]. Therefore, 
 5 
DNOs need to justify and test their decision of selection in line 
with the three targets. Due to approaching of submitting their 
choice, the DNOs are now still on the track to make progress.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented the recent development in 
distribution pricing reform in the UK. It highlights the shorting 
comings with the current distribution pricing and the reported 
the improvement suggested by the industry. In addition, this 
paper also conducted an intensive comparison between LRIC 
and FCP from different aspects. It also reported three scaling 
approaches considered by DNOs for allocating unrecovered 
revenue. The demonstration of the three models was carried 
out on a simple system, which is qualified for illustration 
purposes. It is hard to conclude which scaling approach is 
more preferable, but they need to comply with the targets of 
revenue reconciliation.  
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